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FEDERAL BID PROTESTS: IS THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG?

ABSTRACT. The fear of receiving a bid protest is said to affect acquisition
strategies, yet it has not been empirically explored. Based on the Public
Value Framework and interviews with contracting personnel, this research
tests a model of antecedents to and consequences of the fear of a protest.
Survey data was obtained from a sample of 350 contracting personnel. The
fear of protest is mitigated by having sufficient procurement lead time and by
source selection experience, and increased by protest risk. Fear of protest
increases compromised technical evaluations, added procurement lead time,
and transaction costs, while it decreases contracting officer authority and is
associated with source selection method inappropriateness. Compromised
technical evaluations, in turn, decrease contractor performance while
contracting officer authority increases contractor performance. Thus,
findings suggests that, indeed, the tail is wagging the dog. The research
concludes with several managerial implications, study limitations and future
research directions.

Keywords: Bid Protest; Federal Contracting; Acquisition Strategy;
Source Selection
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FEDERAL BID PROTESTS: IS THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG?
INTRODUCTION

A central tenet of a public contracting system is to maintain the
public’s trust via instilled integrity, fairness, and openness. A bid protest
is a corrective mechanism to ensure integrity and fairness by providing
an interested party with a process to air complaints and obtain relief
(Manuel & Schwartz, 2011). A protest is a written objection that can
occur at any stage of the contract award process (see Table 1). Most
commonly, protests result from alleged errors or mistakes committed by
the agency. The most common errors cited in protests are: poorly written
or vague contract requirements, failure to follow the process or criteria
laid out in the request for proposals, and failure to adequately document
findings (GAO, 2014; Rumbaugh, 2010).
TABLE 1
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 33.101) Definition of a Protest
“Protest” means a written objection by an interested party to any of the
following:
(1) a solicitation or other request by an agency for offers for a contract for
the procurement of property or services,
(2) the cancellation of the solicitation or other request,
(3) an award or proposed award of the contract, or
(4) a termination or cancellation of an award of the contract, if the written
objection contains an allegation that the termination or cancellation is
based in whole or in part on improprieties concerning the award of
the contract.

Increasingly, protests are being filed for business reasons rather
than to correct mistakes or errors. Between 2009 and 2013, protests
grew from 1,989 to 2,429—a 22% increase during a period of increased
federal austerity. When measured against the number of opportunities to
protest from 2011 to 2013, the number of protests increased 29% (from
0.014% to 0.019% of contract actions, including delivery orders). The
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protests have also increased their disruptive power. Of those protest
cases that made it to a decision in 2013 (i.e., the few that were not
dismissed, settled, or withdrawn), 17% were sustained, and 43% of all
protest cases were effective (either sustained or resulted in corrective
action by the agency prior to decision). Evidence from one military
department reveals that bid protest effectiveness increased from 37.9%
in 2005 to 43.9% in 2010; more disturbingly, when controlling for the
number of protestable contract actions, the rate for effective protests
went from 0.65 to 1.59 per 1,000 actions, a 144% increase (FPDS-NG).
Acquisition officials loathe the receipt of a bid protest. The
potential to receive a bid protest drives agencies to incur costs to: (1)
prevent a protest (e.g., thoroughly documenting and substantiating
proposal evaluations and trade-off decisions), (2) to defend against an
actual protest lodged, and (3) to take corrective actions. At best, an
agency’s voluntary corrective action means the competition is reopened,
and proposals are allowed to be revised necessitating further evaluations
and delaying the contract award. At worst, an authority such as the
Government Accountability Office sustains the protest meaning that the
procurement process must often start anew. This adds even more time
and delays receipt of needed goods and services resulting in significant
rework. The end users bear costs as well, since their requirements are
delayed or go unfulfilled. Hereinafter, we refer to the severely negative
attitude toward receiving a bid protest as a “fear of protest.”
Evidence suggests that agencies sometimes change their
acquisition strategies due to fear of protests. For example, fear of a
protest could prompt officials to try to structure a procurement in a
manner they deem less likely to be protested, such as using lowestprice, technically-acceptable (LPTA) source selection method instead of
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a full tradeoff method (Schwartz et al., 2013). Other reactions include
awarding more contracts than intended to avoid a protest (e.g., Littoral
Combat Ship).
While scholars and the GAO have identified these deleterious
effects of bid protests on the government (Gordon, 2013), no research to
date has quantified them. Specifically, we do not know the magnitude of
fear of protests. Neither do we know the extent and manner that fear of a
protest affects acquisition strategies or the lengths that acquisition
professionals will go to avoid a protest. The purpose of this research,
therefore, is to quantify the magnitude of protest fear, and to explore the
antecedents and consequences of protest fear.
The remainder of this research is organized as follows. First, we
present a background on bid protests. Second, the study discusses the
conceptual framework and proposed hypotheses. The Public Value
Framework is consulted to illuminate the relevant antecedents and
consequences (Figure 1). Next, the study presents the research design
and methodology. Then the study provides an analysis of the proposed
models and reports the findings. Lastly, the study offers a summary
discussion, including conclusions and implications.

Background on Bid Protests
The evidence that bid protests are a problem comes from
multiple vectors. Firstly, as already mentioned, the number and
effectiveness of protests are increasing, especially since the economic
downturn. Protests traditionally result from alleged errors or mistakes
such as poorly written or vague contract requirements, or failure to follow
the process or criteria laid out in the request for proposals, or lack of
sufficient documentation (GAO, 2014; Rumbaugh, 2010). Other
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traditional causes of protests include: a lack of meaningful discussions,
defective solicitations, improper exclusion from the competitive range, a
lack of cost realism, and agency bias or bad faith (GAO, 2014;
Rumbaugh, 2010).
The increase in business motivations to file a bid protest derives
from multiple factors. When agencies do not adequately document or
debrief losing bidders, the losing companies may file a protest to
determine why they lost the competition. Losing bidders may try to
demonstrate their commitment to stakeholders and executives, even
setting the precedent for the competition that they will delay contract
award rather than acquiesce quietly (Schwartz, Manuel, & Martinez,
2013). Sometimes protests are filed by incumbents to delay a switch in
contractors, thereby gaining a few more months of revenue.
Bid protests levy monetary and non-monetary costs. Protests
may result in: (1) a stop-work order that suspends performance (i.e., a
delay to the agency), (2) reevaluating proposals (i.e., a second chance),
(3) paying proposal preparation costs and protest filing costs to the
protester (i.e., lost agency funds), (4) terminating an awarded contract(s)
and re-soliciting the project (i.e., a delay to the agency and a second
chance to the protestor) (Rumbaugh, 2010), and/or (5) a settlement that
entails more awards than the agency anticipated to appease the
protestor or a significant subcontract award from the successful prime
contractor (Hoffman, 2013).
Fear of bid protests also increases transaction costs. Often, a
fear of a bid protest will result in awarding more contracts than would
have been awarded if there was no fear of a bid protest. In certain
multiple-award contracts there is a minimum dollar value that the
government is obligated to pay as consideration. This results in
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increased spending of taxpayer money that could have been more
efficiently spent by awarding to fewer, more competitive contractors. For
example, the DODIG (2009) found that under the Seaport-E program,
the Navy awarded 1,279 contracts for professional services yet 975
(75.6%) never received a task order. Each of these contracts required
either a $10,000 or $2,500 minimum obligation. In addition to added
funds, added contracts create extra work for the contracting officer to
administer, duplicate inventory, can increase transportation costs, result
in non-optimal use of taxpayer money, and often upset contractors who
never get an award under a multiple award contract for which they
believed they were competitive. Although a reduced risk of a protest is
accomplished, ultimately less value is added by the contracting process.
What this does not accomplish is a best option for the customer or the
taxpayer, nor does it provide fairness to the stronger contractors.
One way that the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition
workforce avoids protest is to placate potential protesters. For example,
building, fielding, and sustaining two varieties of Littoral Combat Ship
platforms substantially increased costs relative to doing so for a single
platform (O’Rourke, 2014). Another method to avoid bid protests relies
on choosing sub-optimal source selection processes, such as minimizing
discussions or even employing an LPTA source selection process when
a full tradeoff method is more appropriate (Gordon, 2013). For example,
the Air Force seriously considered an LPTA method for its controversyridden aerial tanker acquisition (Pocock, 2009), currently running a $1.5
billion cost overrun (Gates, 2014).
Another tactic to diminish bid protest risk consists of engaging in
multiple rounds of discussions that essentially level the playing field of
competitors rather than providing clearer evaluation criteria up-front. This
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tactic frequently results in retaining mediocre suppliers in the
consideration set, increasing the likelihood for a sub-optimal or mediocre
contractor to provide important outsourced services/goods to the
government. Clearer evaluation criteria better distinguish amongst firms,
diminishing the propensity to retain mediocre firms in the competitive set.
An agency’s best policy to prevent a protest is to mitigate the
causes of the protest; the greater the fear of protest, the more likely the
agency will focus on mitigating the causes of the protest. The desire to
avoid a protest is the driving force behind acquisition decisions, internal
and external policies, and resources applied to mitigate the threat of a
protest (Gordon, 2013; Kendall, 2012; Knauth, 2013; Manuel &
Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2013; Maser & Thompson, 2010;
O’Rourke, 2014). Next we develop the theoretical framework and
hypothesis for the antecedents and consequences of the fear of protests.

LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES
Public Value Framework (PVF)
In the private sector, industry often uses shareholder value as a
means of evaluating itself. In contrast to private sector operations, the
government’s strategy does not revolve around a specific bottom line
such as shareholder wealth. Contracting professionals must satisfy
multiple stakeholders such as regulatory requirements (e.g., the FAR),
internal customers, the private sector, and the taxpaying public. PVF was
introduced by Harvard professor Mark H. Moore and has been used to
evaluate and identify value in the public sector. The PVF has been
utilized to motivate public managers to reconsider what is valuable in
their services, and to rethink the management and effectiveness of their
services (Coats & Passmore, 2008).
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The PVF can be explained by the strategic triangle (Heymann,
1987; Moore, 1995): value, the authorizing environment, and resources.
Value determines how the organization measures its performance. The
purpose of the organization derives from the vision inspired by the value
proposition it provides to the public, usually called public value. The
organization justifies its existence to stakeholders—internal and
external—based on the vision inspired by its definition of public value
(Moore, 2000). In essence, value in a governmental organization
equates to mission. Contracting officers demonstrate value by measuring
performance related to and resulting from their ability to connect capable
suppliers to internal organizations in need of quality goods and services.
The authorizing environment for the organization includes
citizens, elected representatives, interest groups, and the media that
comprise the wellspring of legitimacy and support (Moore, 2000).
Legitimacy and support—tangible and intangible—define the enterprising
leader’s terrain of influence for pursuing public value, and is limited by
the stakeholders and institutions that provide the necessary financial
resources and consent. In turn, the resources define the operational
capability of the organization. Operational capability determines
organizational performance, which depends on sufficient know-how and
capability to attain the defined public value. Operational capability may
reside entirely within the organization, although in the case of contracted
services and goods, it frequently exists outside the organization.
Organizations increasingly leverage supplier relationships to achieve
desired results, which increases the strategic value of the contracting
officer.
PVF observes that in the private sector, organizational survival
and financial performance align well with the social value of the
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organization. A retailer that efficiently and effectively provides needed
goods to consumers will survive and be profitable. Non-profits exist to
provide needed social value where the private sector cannot be
profitable and sustain itself. For the non-profit manager, benefits accrue
as the result of satisfying stakeholders in the authorizing environment,
ideally through demonstrated delivery of public value. However, different
members of the authorizing environment often have differing priorities
when it comes to public value and how to achieve it.
Contracting professionals add value by helping to meet the
operational needs of the government and, at the same time, providing
fairness and addressing the various public policy issues required by law
and regulation. When these align, customers receive what they require at
a fair and reasonable price, and this satisfies the requirements of
governing policies.
Contracting officers sometimes take steps throughout the
acquisition process to avoid a protest. With regard to the fear of protest,
high dollar contracts in particular hold great interest to media and elected
officials; there may be an element of public shame if a source selection is
protested. If there is a notion that organizational management would not
support the contracting officers and that the protest may reflect poorly on
them in the media or political arena, there can be a tendency to take
measures that can sub-optimize source selection decisions and
outcomes in order to avoid a protest. With these concerns in the back of
a contracting officer’s mind, the contracting officer may, for example,
minimize discussions or even employ an LPTA source selection process
when a full tradeoff method is more appropriate (Gordon, 2013). When
this occurs, the contracting system is not optimizing public value.
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Fear of a protest is a pragmatic concern for contracting
professionals. Significant time is consumed addressing a protest.
Ultimately, contracting officers then have less time and resources to
devote to other duties; the needs of the customer do not stop because of
a protest. This decreases the value of the contracting support.

Antecedents to Fear of Protest
Sufficiency of Planned Procurement Administrative Lead Time
For buyers, time has become the ultimate non-fungible resource,
with important implications for the sourcing and supplier relationship
processes. One major retailer’s buyers meet only one hour per quarter
with suppliers (Hansen, 2009). Indeed, the relationship management
strategy

reduces

essentially

to

the

time

management

strategy

designated during the source selection process.
Sufficient planned procurement administrative lead time (PALT)
represents the extent to which adequate time is allotted to accomplish a
source selection. Insufficient PALT is often the result of funding
constraints that occur toward the end of the fiscal year.

Expedited

requirements and poor planning are also common reasons that can lead
to insufficient PALT. Protestable errors are more likely to occur when
sufficient lead time is not allocated (Hawkins et al., 2011) to: properly
define requirements, evaluation criteria, and instructions to offerors; train
the technical evaluators; evaluate proposals; document evaluations and
tradeoffs; and prepare for and brief decision makers. The acquisition
team’s capability to perform a source selection successfully depends on
sufficient time to prepare.
In terms of PVF, time affords the ability for acquisition teams to
apply their knowledge and skills, bolstering operational capability.

12

Acquisition

professionals

also

need

time

to

communicate

with

stakeholders to garner support and communicate potential impacts to the
value proposition. Insufficient time constrains operational capability,
support from the authorizing environment, and evaluation of impacts on
public value. Therefore, it is posited that:
H1: Insufficient planned PALT is positively related to fear of
protest.
Contracting Officer Experience
The PVF holds that operational capability is the measure of how
government activities deliver value. Operational capability represents
requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities—all of which depend on
experience. Buyer experience has been found to affect government
procurement processes (Hawkins and Muir, 2014). The more experience
a contracting officer has, the less concern of a protest there should be
since the individual has acquired more knowledge in techniques and
practices to prevent bid protests and prevail in the event of a protest.
Experience reflects the sum total of the contracting officer’s
knowledge, skills, and abilities that result from experience at source
selection decisions. In the PVF, organizational goals derive from its
definition of public value, and contracting officer experience represents a
primary source of operational capability for performance at achieving
value. Econom (2006) argued that federal agencies must consider
contract management as a core competency because the functions
performed by third-party contractors are often essential in successfully
achieving organizational goals. She concluded that the success of
acquisition organizations is largely dependent on hiring personnel who
possess the right mix of skills, abilities, experience, and training.
Practitioner survey work reveals that a small percentage (~5%) of
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acquisition leaders rates the workforce as highly competent, indicating
that competence is a scarce resource (Clark, 2015).
Other studies have also found that this right mix is critical to
achieving contract performance outcomes (United States Merit Systems
Protection Board, 2005). Time spent in a competency correlates strongly
with self-reported proficiency levels in that competency (FAI, 2012),
suggesting that experience matters. In terms of public value, greater
contracting officer experience improves operational capability through
enhanced understanding and expertise with the authorizing environment.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H2: The greater contracting officer experience, the lower the fear
of protest.
Consequences of Fear of Protest
Compromised Technical Evaluation
Evaluation factors and significant sub factors must (1) represent
the key areas of importance and emphasis to be considered in the
source selection decision; and (2) support meaningful comparison and
discrimination

between

and

among

competing

proposals

(FAR

15.304(b)). Agencies must evaluate the proposals and assess their
relative qualities based only on the factors and subfactors specified in
the request for proposal (RFP) (Rumbaugh, 2010). Deviations from the
strict language defining the meaning of factors and subfactors can invite
protests. Technical evaluators often do not understand or appreciate this
constraint. In terms of PVF, poorly-trained or technical evaluators
unknowledgeable in source selections inhibit the agency’s operational
capability.
Commonly, the evaluators assessing proposals are not the same
individuals who defined the meaning of the factors and subfactors. Thus,
technical evaluators can bring their own interpretation or agenda to bear
14

on their evaluations based upon their relationship to different
components of the authorizing environment that provides legitimacy and
support. For these reasons, the contracting officer, legal advisor, and
contracts committee advisors often require numerous, meticulous
changes to precise wording of evaluations. Evaluators are constrained
on what they can say in the evaluation – even though the point otherwise
intended may make a meaningful distinction between offers. Additionally,
definitions of the factors or subfactors may not account for meaningful
distinctions. Often this phenomenon reflects a lack of foresight –
sometimes preventable, sometimes not. Sometimes the distinction is
only illuminated upon evaluation of proposals. At this point, the source
selection team must weigh a delay in the schedule against the benefit of
changing the definition of factors or subfactors to account for the
meaningful distinction, and allow offerors time to revise their proposals.
Often, however, the customer is not willing to delay the source selection,
and the subfactors are not revised. As described by PVF, the disconnect
between profit and social good pushes contracting officers toward
managing a leg of the strategic triangle under their influence; by
compromising technical evaluations (operational capability), they elevate
performance measures presented to their authorizing environment,
which diminishes the fear of protest. Therefore, it is posited that:
H3: Fear of protest is positively related to compromised technical
evaluations.
Source Selection Method Appropriateness
The acquisition’s authorizing environment for competitive formal
source selections allows several methods: lowest-price, technicallyacceptable (LPTA), price-performance tradeoff (PPT), or a full tradeoff.
In PVF logic, each method defines how to measure the public value of
the contract. According to FAR 15.101-2, the LPTA source selection
15

process is appropriate when best value is expected to result from
selection of the technically-acceptable proposal with the lowest
evaluated price. There are many reasons why a contracting officer might
opt for the LPTA. One major benefit of this strategy is that the agency
can greatly shorten the evaluation process because once the low price
proposal has been found to be technically acceptable, there is no need
to evaluate the acceptability of any other proposals (Cibinic et al., 2011,
p. 680).
The source selection method appropriateness depends on the
requirement and the buying situation. Generally, the greater the
performance risk, criticality of the requirement’s successful delivery to
the agency’s mission, dollar value, environmental dynamism, uncertain
requirements,

and

complexity,

the

more

important

contractor

performance becomes and the less critical cost/price become. In these
cases, an agency may decide that the best-value offer is determined by
a full tradeoff of price and non-price factors. A full tradeoff process is
appropriate when it may be in the best interest of the government to
consider an award to a company other than the lowest-priced offeror or
other than the highest technically-rated offeror (FAR 15.101-1).
In practice, however, agencies may not select the source
selection method that is best suited to the requirement and the buying
situation. Indeed, a practitioner survey indicates that only 5% of
acquisition leaders rated the workforce highly competent at selecting the
right contract structures, techniques and strategies (Clark, 2015).
Today’s budget-constrained environment may influence managers to
prefer LPTA over a full tradeoff. Managers may also wish to avoid a
protest, in which case the LPTA method is clearly the lower-risk
alternative. Air Force acquisition leaders, following several bid protests
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and failed attempts to acquire a new tanker aircraft, seriously considered
an LPTA method for a multi-billion dollar weapon system (Pocock, 2009).
Finally, quite often managers prioritize the contract award date (i.e.,
PALT) over due diligence in contractor selection (Hawkins, 2012). These
factors implicate overuse of LPTA because it is simpler and faster, with
lower risk of making a protestable mistake. In all these scenarios, public
value and organizational performance suffer in the eyes of the
authorizing environment, and contracting officers resort to changing the
definition of performance to reduce the perceived threat to public value
performance. Therefore, we posit that:
H4: Fear of protest is negatively related to source selection
method appropriateness.

Added PALT
Naturally, as the concern over a protest grows, acquisition teams
take added measures to prevent them. In PVF terms, concerns over a
protest embody threats to legitimacy and support.

Added measures

reflect acquisition team efforts to leverage operational capability to
bolster public value performance in response to the threats. Added
measures often manifest as increased reviews resulting in increased
iterations of source selection documents such as source selection plans,
requests for proposals, technical evaluations, small business strategy,
comparative analyses, briefing charts, source selection decision
documents, and evaluation notices to offerors – just to name a few.
These revisions consume time during the source selection. Additionally,
a conservative stance may result in added rounds of discussions to clear
up all proposal deficiencies and weaknesses – a concept referred to as
technical leveling. Conservatism may also result in retaining otherwise
non-competitive offerors in the competitive range adding time to
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negotiate with and evaluate another offer. Theoretically, acquisition
managers have limited influence over the authorizing environment
(legislation), but they do have influence over PALT, an important
operational capability that may improve performance. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that:
H5: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest
and the added PALT.
Contracting Officer Perceived Authority
Contracting officers uniquely hold authority to enter into,
administer, and terminate contracts. They are the only individuals
authorized by law to bind the U.S. Government. Contracting officers are
responsible for: (1) ensuring that all the necessary actions for effective
contracting are accomplished, (2) ensuring compliance with the terms of
the contract, and (3) safeguarding the interests of the U.S. Government
in its contractual relationships. In terms of PVF, the contracting officer’s
authority provides the operational capability to protect the various
stakeholders’ interests (e.g., taxpayer, contractor, Government, internal
customers). In this capacity, the contracting officer reinforces legitimacy
and support in the pursuit of greater public value.
While contracting officers must request and consider the advice
of specialists (e.g., law, engineering, finance, etc.), ultimately, decisions
within their purview are their responsibility (FAR 1.602-2). Upon receipt
of a protest, legal counsel must divert time and effort to defend the
agency’s actions. Thus, legal counsel reviews the many iterations of the
multitude of source selection documents to ensure legal sufficiency,
compliance to regulations and policies, and to mitigate the risks of
protests. With the consequences at stake, such as setting precedent,
reputation, and invested time, legal counsel is typically conservative in
attempting to prevent a bid protest. Since legal counsel brings their own
18

unique legal authority and professional expertise, contracting officers and
acquisition managers rely heavily on its opinions and recommendations.
Contracting officers are likely to yield their decision making discretion
(e.g., removing an offeror from the competitive range) when legal
counsel disagrees with them. During the scale development process for
this study, one interviewee shared: “We almost never move forward
unless they [legal] give us their okay. It would be very, very hard—very
challenging.” This comment alludes to the influence of legal counsel on
acquisition and unit leaders; in its advisory role, it subtly, yet strongly,
affects the contracting officer’s authority through its opinions and
recommendations.
Other parties impose a similar sway on contracting officers’
decision authority. For example, higher ranking contracts committee
members and leaders may also hold opinions on a particular source
selection matter that are contrary to that of the contracting officer. In
such cases, contracting officers may perceive unwritten career
implications to making contrarian decisions. Thus, although certain
statutory authority resides with the contracting officer, the reality is that
such authority is yielded in practice. As protest risk – and thus, fear of a
protest - grows, so does the involvement of legal counsel, other
reviewing parties, and acquisition leaders. Increased involvement likely
reduces the contracting officer’s perception of decision latitude. In some
instances, contracting officers indicate that legal counsel would not allow
them to make decisions – creating the organizational norm that legal has
the final decision, not the contracting officer. As posited by PVF’s
strategic triangle—and as intended by law—the operational capability of
the contracting officer depends on the legitimacy and support from the
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legal and other oversight in the authorizing environment. Thus, we posit
that:
H6: There is a negative relationship between fear of protest and
the contracting officer’s perceived authority.

When an individual holds decision-making authority coupled
with accountability for the results of decisions (e.g., a contracting officer),
he or she tends not to defer decisions entirely to others. This is not to
say, however, that others are not consulted. In public contracting, similar
to input from advisors on source selection method choices, advisors
review all of the written technical evaluations with respect to the
evaluation criteria published in the request for proposals. They screen for
errors, omissions, consistency, and other matters of compliance with
laws, regulations, and policies in an effort to mitigate the odds of
receiving a bid protest. In doing so, they are aligning the legitimacy and
support with their other resources in order to bolster public value
outcomes. Advisors often limit what the technical evaluators can say.
Such scrutiny can make difficult the ability to meaningfully discriminate
between proposals. Similar to the previously-discussed rationale, while
contracting officers also review the technical evaluations for errors, they
are more apt to accept more risk. Thus, it is posited that:

H7: Contracting officer authority is negatively related to
compromised technical evaluations.

Transaction Costs
The substantial increase in protests by industry against
competitive sourcing decisions have increased legal and acquisition
requirements, caused program delays, and delayed delivery (Young,
2007)—all of which increase transaction costs. Transaction costs reflect
the monetary costs of resources devoted to executing a formal source
20

selection – largely comprised of labor costs of the different acquisition
professionals involved such as the contracting officer, contracting
specialist, technical evaluator, legal counsel, cost/price analyst, past
performance team, program manager, Small Business Administration
representative, and consultants. Transaction costs could be considered
an opportunity cost of resources not devoted to other work requirements
(e.g., contract and program administration).
An increased risk of protest provokes risk mitigation in the form
of increased operational capability; in other words, more personnel are
involved and they allocate more of their time and effort to defending
against a potential bid protest. Thus,
H8: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest
and transaction costs.

Contractor Performance
An organization’s mission is increasingly performed or supported
via outsourced contracts, which means that contractor success has
become a strategic component of operational capability for the agency it
supports. In order for an agency to provide its public value, the supplier
must perform well under the obligations of their contract. The
development of contract obligations during the source selection process
determines the level of performance ultimately received.
When the Government utilizes a best-value source selection
method, technical evaluators apply evaluation factors and subfactors to
proposals to determine the best-value offer. This process helps the
government to hedge against substandard and/or non-performance by
weeding out the less-capable firms (or teams of firms). The premise of
source selection is that by applying the evaluation factors and
subfactors, a very capable contractor has higher odds of being deemed
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the best-value offer.

Nonetheless, the Government struggles in its

efforts to unambiguously define technical factors and subfactors such
that they can make meaningful distinctions between offers (Rumbaugh,
2010). Once weaknesses in evaluation factors are realized, particularly
after receipt of proposals, acquisition teams are reluctant to fix the
factors by amending the RFP and inviting revised proposals since this
delays the acquisition milestones. Additionally, conservative evaluators
(and their advisors), for fear of protest, often engage in multiple rounds of
discussions that essentially level the playing field of competitors, and
often they retain mediocre offerors in the competitive range for fear of
receiving a bid protest. Had the evaluation criteria been better able to
distinguish amongst the firms, the propensity to retain mediocre firms
within the competitive range would be diminished. In essence, the
legitimacy provided by the authorizing environment is redirected to
undermine the contracting agency’s operational capability for technical
evaluation, which diminishes the third leg of the PVF strategic triangle:
performance. Together, therefore, it is expected that:

H9: There is a negative relationship between compromised
technical evaluation and contractor performance.
Contracting officers are generally more cognizant of and
empathetic to the effects of contractor performance on the requiring
organization’s mission attainment than are risk-averse advisors such as
legal counsel. Contracting officers may prioritize mission performance
over protest risk in making key decisions during a source selection. For
example, they may be more apt to remove a less-competitive or lesscapable offeror from the competitive range, assign a lower proposal
rating, and not engage in added rounds of discussions solely to mitigate
protest risk (thereby mitigating technical leveling). In some cases,
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contracting officers may also be more apt to choose a full tradeoff rather
than a LPTA source selection method as the most appropriate means to
attain the best-value contractor. The full tradeoff method allows the
Government the flexibility to pay more for superior capability and/or past
performance when warranted. Since the procedures are so nuanced, full
tradeoff also requires more effort, invites more error, and thus, protest
risk. These actions reduce the odds of having to award a contract to a
less-capable contractor, for example, in the case of a LPTA source
selection method. In effect, proper alignment of legitimacy and support
with contracting operational capability bolsters public value outcomes.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that:

H10: There is a positive relationship between source selection
method appropriateness and contractor performance.

Taken together, then, it is expected that a contracting officer with
decision-making authority – and who does not defer that authority to
others - will make decisions that accept more risk yet does not impede
the selection of the best-suited contractor for the task at hand. When the
selection is not constrained by procedures, greater decision latitude
results in a better match between the offeror’s capabilities and the
contractual requirements. This reflects better alignment between the legs
of PVF’s strategic triangle: the authorizing environment bolsters the
contracting officer’s capability to align the offeror’s capabilities with the
desired public value outcomes. Examining the troubled U.S. defense
acquisition system’s capability to reinforce contracting officer authority,
the Defense Business Board concluded: “Of the eight findings, three of
them concern the acquisition workforce, a large group of dedicated
public servants who work diligently, but ultimately struggle within a
broken system that is focused on avoiding mistakes rather than
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producing more, in less time, at less cost” (Punaro, 2012). The
contracting officer achieves contract success in proportion to the
authorization and support from the acquisition authorizing environment.
Therefore, it is posited that:

H11: There is a positive relationship between contracting officer
authority and contractor performance.
The relationships posited above are visually depicted in Figure 1.
Fear of protest can also be affected by the criticality of the requirement
and by protest risk. Therefore, these constructs are shown as control
variables.

Figure 1
Conceptual Model of Fear of Protest

Sufficiency of
Planned PALT

Compromised
Technical
Evaluation
H3

H1

Experience

H7
Perceived
Contracting
Officer
Authority

H6
(-)

H2
(-)

Control

H4

Fear of
Protest

H9

(-)

(+)

(-)

(-)

H5

Source Selection
Method
Appropriateness

(-)

H11
(+)

H10
(+)

Contractor
Performance

(+)

Requirement
Criticality

H8
(+)

Protest Risk

Added PALT

Transaction Costs

METHODOLOGY
This study employed a survey to collect empirical data followed
by quantitative analysis.

The research employed structural equation

models using the cross-sectional survey data. The remainder of this
section details the survey development, pretest, the sample, data
collection, and reliability and validity.
Questionnaire Design and Construct Measurement
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All scales measuring latent constructs used a Likert-type scale.
No previously-validated scales were available to measure the fear of
protest, contracting officer authority, and source selection method
appropriateness; thus, interview data (Appendix A) were used to develop
these scale items (Appendix B). Fear of protest describes the level of
apprehension a contracting professional has about receiving a bid
protest. The contracting officer authority construct described how
empowered the contracting officer is to make final decisions during the
source selection process. Source selection method appropriateness is
the perceived extent that the chosen source selection method fits the
requirement, the goals of the source selection, the commercial market,
and the acquisition situation.
Pre-existing scales were used when available. A three-question
scale was used to measure the sufficiency of planned PALT in the
milestones and allocated by the acquisition team and its managers to
conduct the source selection (Hawkins and Muir, 2014). Compromised
technical evaluation assessed the extent to which technical evaluators
complained about the limitations imposed on the wording of their written
technical evaluations. Contractor performance is a measure of the
contractor’s performance levels and the degree to which requirements
were satisfied. The scale was adapted from Fawcett, Smith, & Cooper
(1997), Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach (2000), and Prahinski & Benton
(2004).
The remaining variables were objectively measured. Experience
was measured as the number of source selections the respondent
previously experienced. This could include FAR Part 15 (i.e., formal) and
non-FAR Part 15 (e.g., simplified) source selections. It could also include
those source selections to which the respondent served as the procuring
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contracting officer as well as those to which the respondent served as an
advisor, reviewer, or specialist. Added PALT objectively measured the
difference between the planned PALT (in days) and the actual PALT (in
days). Transaction costs attempted to quantify the personnel costs
based on amount of time spent on the source selection by each member
of the team. Transaction costs were calculated by asking respondents
the number of people by role, pay grade, and fraction of one year’s time
spent on the source selection. The average 2013 General Schedule
annual pay was used to calculate the cost for each role, and then
summed for each source selection.
Survey Pretest
Six industry practitioners and academicians tested the initial
survey to ensure face validity, construct validity, to construct and validate
a conceptual model, and to help develop survey items to validly measure
the constructs – many of which were new (i.e., measurement scales did
not exist).

Additionally, 18 contracting officers were interviewed

(Appendix A). Feedback received was used to refine questions and limit
survey length. As a result, one construct was removed and the order of
the survey questions was structured to reduce bias among scale items
by mixing questions across constructs with like scales and scale
anchors.
Sample
The population for this study consisted of U.S. civilian and
military contracting personnel who had executed a FAR Part 15 formal
source selection (i.e., a dollar amount greater than $150,000). This
excluded simplified procurements that are generally less susceptible to
bid protests. A list of e-mail addresses was generated using data
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extracted from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation
(FPDS-NG) database to encompass all transactions that fit the criteria
previously stated.
The unit of analysis for this survey was one source selection
event. Since nearly all bid protests stem from a protestable action (e.g., a
proposal rating, rating justification, or basis of a tradeoff analysis)
associated with a source selection, this is the proper unit of analysis for
the study. Respondents were instructed to answer the survey questions
using their experience from their most recently-completed FAR Part 15
source selection. The most recent source selection was required to serve
as the basis of reference in order to prevent respondents’ self-selection
bias.

RESULTS
Data Collection
An online survey was used to collect the data. In order to
maximize the response rate, we utilized Dillman’s (2000) “Tailored
Design Method” for internet surveys. A survey invitation was sent via email to 3,882 contracting officers who had executed a FAR Part 15based formal source selection. The survey was left active for 42 days,
with 3 reminders being sent during that time. There were 661 responses
received, which yielded a 17% response rate. Of the responses received,
311 were deleted due to missing or obviously invalid data, leaving 350
usable responses. The final response rate of usable responses was 9%.
The average respondent had 13.6 years of federal contracting
experience. Male respondents accounted for 50.64 percent and female
respondents accounted for 49.36 percent. Only 2.29% of respondents
held only a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma, 3.14%
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held an associate’s degree, 38% held a bachelor’s degree, 54% held a
master’s degree, and 2.57% held a doctorate. The average number of
protests experienced was 1.96, and 15.4% of respondents had
experienced a sustained protest.
TABLE 2
Contract Type and Goods/Services Procured
Contract Type

Fixed Price
Cost
Reimbursement
Time and
Materials

% of
Total

Supply or
Service
Purchased

% of
Total

60.00%

Services

58.00%

27.14%

Construction

16.86%

1.14%

Labor Hours

0.57%

Hybrid

9.14%

Other

2.00%

Supplies or
Commodities
Weapons
System
Other Capital
Equipment

15.71%
6.57%
2.86%

Reliability and Validity
Through iterative scale purification (Churchill, 1979) using
exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation, 39 survey items
reduced to 25 across seven latent factors. The reliability of latent
constructs was assessed using composite reliabilities (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981). These measures, ranging from .80 to .96 (see Table 3),
proved to be sufficiently reliable, exceeding the minimum acceptable
threshold of .70 (Nunnally, 1978). Construct validity was assessed via
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in LISREL version 8.8. In the
measurement model all loadings were significant at the .05 level,
standard errors were not abnormal; no standardized loadings exceeded
1.0, and no negative error variances (Heywood Cases) occurred. The
measurement model (CFA) exhibited acceptable fit (Table 5).
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TABLE 3
Correlation Matrix and Composite Reliabilities
FEAR

PALTP

RC

EXP

PRISK

CTE

PALTA

SSMA

AUTH

FEAR

.90

PALTP

-.21*

.81

RC

.10

-.04

.86

EXP

-.10

-.09

.01

---

PRISK

.20*

-.24*

.14*

.00

---

CTE

.25*

-.24*

-.02

-.04

.13*

.80

PALTA

.11*

-.06

.03

.06

.09

.01

---

SSMA

-.07

.28*

.26*

.03

.01

-.22*

-.04

.92

AUTH

-.09

.20*

.20*

.10

-.06

-.24*

-.03

.40*

.89

PERF

-.06

.20

.20*

.00

-.06

-.24*

-.11*

.30*

.21*

TC

.12*

.00
.17*
-.13*
.09
.13*
.06
-.02
.04
Notes: (1) Correlations are below the diagonal. (2) Composite reliabilities
of the latent factors are on the diagonal. (3) *Significant, p<.05 (4)
FEAR=fear of protest; PALTP=sufficiency of planned procurement lead time;
RC=requirement
criticality;
EXP=source
selection
experience;
PRISK=protest risk; CTE=compromised technical evaluation; PALTA=added
procurement lead time; SSMA=source selection method appropriateness;
AUTH=contracting
officer
perceived
authority;
PERF=contractor
performance; TC=transaction costs.

Table 4 shows the average variance extracted (AVE) of each
construct; all exceeded the .50 standard, demonstrating convergent
validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). We then compared each AVE to the
variance shared between constructs. None of the shared variances
approached the AVE, providing sufficient evidence that the constructs
were indeed unique (Lam, Shankar and Murthy, 2004). We tested for
non-response bias using Armstrong & Overton’s (1977) approach.
Responses were categorized into three groups according to the time
received. Tests for differences in three latent constructs and two
demographic variables revealed no significant differences, indicating a
lack of response bias in the data.
TABLE 4
Convergent and Discriminant Validity
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PERF

TC

.96
-.16

---

FEAR

PALTP

RC

CTE

SSMA

AUTH

FEAR

.70

PALTP

.04

.59

RC

.01

.00

.68

CTE

.06

.06

.04

.59

SSMA

.00

.08

.07

.05

.79

AUTH

.01

.04

.04

.06

.16

.74

PERF

.00

.04

.04

.06

.09

.04

Notes: (1) Diagonal entries represent average variance extracted (AVE).
(2) Off-diagonal entries represent shared variance.

TABLE 5
Measurement and Structural Models
Model

χ2
(dof)

TLI

CFI

AGFI

RMSEA

SRMR

Critical
N

Measurement
(CFA)
Full Structural

396.8
(308)
534.8
(334),
p<.01
374.3
(262),
p<.01

.99

.99

.90

.026

.04

326

.98

.98

.88

.040

.10

261

.98

.98

.91

.032

.079

298

Trimmed
Structural

A structural equation model (SEM) was then fit to the data. A
global assessment (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) of the various goodness-of-fit
indices indicated questionable fit (Table 5). Most problematic were the
AGFI (< .90) and the SRMR (>.08). Examining the hypotheses, the
relationship between fear of protest and source selection method
appropriateness (SSMA) was not significant. Therefore, we trimmed
SSMA from the model. The trimmed model exhibited solid fit (Table 5).
While the chi square test was significant, indicating a difference between
the hypothesized model and the data, the CFI, TLI, AGFI, RMSEA and
SRMR suggest good fit. Table 6 shows the results of hypotheses tested
using the trimmed SEM. Nine of eleven hypotheses tested were
supported, although the variance explained in the focal endogenous
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PERF

.81

construct - fear of protest – by the exogenous constructs was very low
(9%).
TABLE 6
Test Of Hypotheses & Estimates Of Structural Equations Model

Tests of Hypotheses****
H1: Sufficiency of Planned
PALT to Fear of Protest
H2: Source Selection
Experience to Fear of Protest
Requirement Criticality to Fear
of Protest
Protest Risk to Fear of Protest
H3: Fear of Protest to
Compromised Technical
Evaluation
†***H4: Fear of Protest to
Source Selection Method
Appropriateness
H5:Fear of Protest to Added
PALT
H6: Fear of Protest to
Contracting Officer Perceived
Authority
H7: Contracting Officer
Perceived Authority to
Compromised Technical
Evaluation
H9: Compromised Technical
Evaluation to Contractor
Performance
***H10: Source Selection
Method Appropriateness to
Contractor Performance

Standardized
Estimate
-.20

tvalue
-3.28

Result*
(S/NS)
S

-.12

-2.24

S

.06

1.02

Control

.15
.21

2.57
3.29

Control
S

NS

.12

2.16

S

-.11

-1.91

S**

-.23

-3.97

S

-.21

-3.64

S

NS

H11: Contracting Officer
Perceived Authority to
Contractor Performance

.22

2.97

S

*Supported(S)/Not Supported(NS) at the .05 level of significance;
**Marginally significant (p<.10)
***SSMA trimmed from the full model due to poor fit
****H7 Not tested via SEM
†Also see Post Hoc Analysis section below for partial support for H4.

Hypothesis eight (H8) posited a positive relationship between
fear of protest and transaction costs. Complete and valid data to
measure transaction costs was only obtained from 270 of the 350
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respondents; therefore, H8 was tested outside of the SEM model using
regression, and was supported (F=5.63; β=.14, t=2.37, p=.018). The
values of transaction costs ranged from $700.08 to $3,551,944.33. The
average transaction cost per source selection was $235,236.34 (median
= $165,832.55; std dev = $291,620.05).

Control Variables
Two control variables were used in order to account for the
expected significant effects on fear of protest. Requirement criticality
represents the level of significance of a particular acquisition to the unit’s
mission. This predictor did not significantly affect fear of protest (Table
6). Protest risk consists of two parts since risk is comprised of the sum of
the products of the magnitude of the consequences and the probability of
occurrence. Questions assessed the desirability of each of five
consequences of a protest and each of their associated probabilities of
occurring. The five consequences were validated by interview informants
to be those most likely to occur and those most abhorred. Risk was
calculated by multiplying each consequence’s probability of occurrence
by the desirability of the consequence. The summed result yielded an
overall protest risk score for each survey response, or record. Protest
risk consisted of five possible consequences using a Likert-type scale
with anchors of completely undesirable and completely desirable, and
then listed the same five consequences using a probability of occurrence
scale with anchors of 0% to 100%. Protest risk was a significant predictor
of fear of protest (Table 6).
Post Hoc Analysis
A series of logistic regressions were then run on the perceived
appropriateness of two types of source selections—LPTA and full trade-
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off—using respondent rating of appropriateness of the source selection
method used. The first step in the test was to include only the
respondents that used the particular source selection method (i.e., LPTA
or full trade-off). A dummy variable was then created to ascertain how
appropriate the respondent thought the use of the method was. The
questions used a seven-point Likert-type scale with 1 being “Completely
Inappropriate” and 7 being “Completely Appropriate.” Respondents that
answered the questions with scores of 3 or less were coded as 1, and all
others were coded as 0. Relevantly, 13 out of 133 respondents used
LPTA even though they felt it was to some degree inappropriate, and 10
respondents out of 174 used full trade-off even though they felt it was to
some degree inappropriate. This totals 7.49% of the 307 respondents
that used either LPTA or trade-off as a source selection method. Both
tests used the same binary fear of protest independent variable (Hi/Low)
in the aforementioned tests. The logistic regression test to measure the
relationship with the use of the Full Trade-off inappropriateness was not
significant (p=.181). The test using LPTA inappropriateness was
significant (p=.015) with an odds ratio of 4.673, revealing partial support
for H4. A test of the effect of LPTA inappropriateness on contractor
performance was significant and negative (p=.01; odds ratio of -4.36),
lending partial support to H10.
We also measured the difference between how many contracts
were planned and how many were actually awarded. A binary variable
was created in which respondents that saw more contracts awarded than
planned were coded as 1 (19 instances; 5.4%), and all others 0.
However, the test of a relationship to fear of protest was not significant
(p=.350).
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We asked the 350 respondents how many times they had: (1)
awarded a task/delivery order, (2) awarded a sole source contract, and
(3) found a way to modify and existing contract, each in order to avoid a
protestable competitive procurement. Of the 84 using task orders to
avoid a protest, they did this 47 times over their career on average. Of
the 67 using sole source, they did this an average of 15 times. And, of
the 64 using modifications, they did this 17 times on average.

DISCUSSSION
The objective of this research was to measure the magnitude of
fear of protest and to identify its antecedents and consequences. The
evidence provides empirical validation for fear of protest. The PVF was
instructive toward these ends, and helped to explain underlying
rationales for the effects. The purpose was to better understand the
impacts that fear of protests has on acquisition strategy decisions. This is
important since acquisition strategy decisions affect the contractor that is
selected and the ultimate level of performance that is received. To
examine fear of protest, a structural equation model of its antecedents
and consequences was tested and found to exhibit good fit to a sample
of data from 350 contracting personnel. Many of the findings have
significant managerial implications to the effective execution of source
selections.
Findings and Implications
Our evidence reveals that insufficient planned procurement leadtime increases the level of fear of a protest. When acquisition personnel
have less time than they believe is necessary to properly conduct the
source selection, they perceive greater odds of making a mistake that
could be protested. When contracting officers are rushed, contractual
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documents (e.g., statements of work) and pre-award communications
(e.g., negotiations) could be compromised which may decrease
contractor performance (Hawkins et al., 2011). Shortcuts could preclude
the selection of the best contractor or result in selecting a contractor that
does not fully understand the requirements. To prevent rushed
acquisitions, standard lead times by type of source selection and by
complexity of the requirement could be established.
A contracting officer’s experience lowered the level of fear of bid
protests. Of the 350 survey respondents, the average number of source
selections experienced over a career was of 36.7. That is just under 2.8
source selections per year. Note that this seemingly high number of
source selections likely includes simplified buys and experience in a
variety of roles such as a peer or committee reviewer as well as a
contracting officer. Increasing the number of source selections
experienced by contracting officers can decrease the fear of protests.
There is no equal alternative to on-the-job-training (OJT), but source
selection simulations and scenario-based training could be utilized as an
alternative and as a supplement to OJT. If the acquisition community is
relying solely on OJT, it can take a contracting officer and technical
evaluators far too long to gain an adequate level of competence with
FAR Part 15 source selections.
Fear of protest appeared to compromise technical evaluations;
compromised technical evaluations decreased contractor performance.
This construct assessed phenomena such as: (1) technical evaluators
not being allowed to say what needs to be said in a technical evaluation,
(2) constraints imposed on the evaluations impeding the ability to write a
meaningful evaluation, and (3) upon evaluation of proposals, a technical
evaluator recognizing a need to change at least one evaluation criterion
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or its definition. Additional training for the technical evaluators could help
increase their level of competence within the evaluation process. The
evaluation process involves many people that are not necessarily familiar
with the case law and pitfalls giving rise to bid protests. Additionally, the
technical individuals that determine and define the evaluation criteria
should be the same individuals that evaluate proposals (i.e., apply the
criteria). Current, detailed, and standardized training for technical
evaluators should result in better-defined evaluation criteria and better
application of them to proposals.
While fear of protest did not affect perceived source selection
method

appropriateness,

protest

fear

was

associated

with

the

inappropriate use of the LPTA source selection method; in turn, LPTA
inappropriateness negatively affected contractor performance. While
these effects have been anecdotally espoused by practitioners, this
research is the first to quantitatively test the postulates. There were 23
respondents (7.5%) that revealed that the source selection method used
was to some degree inappropriate. While this proportion appears small, it
can be argued that any single instance of an inappropriate source
selection method gives room for pause. LPTA could be inappropriately
used since: (1) evaluations can generally be accomplished more quickly
and easily when evaluated as pass/fail rather than by a subjective rating;
(2) the government’s recent increased focus on low price; and (3) the
lower odds of receiving a bid protest compared to arduous and mistakeprone procedures of a full tradeoff method. Further research should
confirm reasons why inappropriate source selection methods are
employed, then acquisition leaders should seek ways to mitigate those
factors. Perhaps contracting officers should be able to tap an
independent panel of contracting professionals when they encounter
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leaders or reviewers who will only approve a source selection method
that does not correspond well to the buying situation.
These findings are also germane to contractors. When a buying
office develops an acquisition strategy that appears ill-suited to the
buying situation (e.g., LPTA versus full tradeoff for a highly complex
requirement), it may be due to the fear of a bid protest. However,
prospective offerors may misinterpret the use of LPTA as an added
emphasis on price. Their bid strategy, then, may be influenced by
reducing costs and price, thereby putting high performance at risk, even
though the agency may not actually be terribly concerned about price.
The fear of protest diminishes a contracting officer’s perceived
authority. Diminished contracting officer perceived authority was found to
decrease contractor performance directly. Contracting officer’s perceived
authority also affects contractor performance indirectly by decreasing
compromised technical evaluations. Many decisions and source
selection documents receive scrutiny via a litany of outside reviews (e.g.,
supervisors, peer review, contracts committees, legal). Often, legal
consel and committee advisors will conservatively require wording
changes to documents, changes to ratings, amendments to the request
for proposals, impose further discussions to clear up any uncertainty in
evaluations, and retain offerors in the competitive range – just to name a
few.
This level of oversight is another signal of the importance the
government places in avoiding a bid protest. Admittedly, it also coincides
with a less competent acquisition workforce (Punaro, 2012). Rather than
treating the problem, however, the symptoms gain the attention; fixing
the problems of contracting officer competence and a cumbersome
source selection processes is difficult and lengthy, while adding oversight
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is quick and simple. The implications are clear: better training is needed
for contracting personnel and technical evaluators to develop the
requisite competence in source selections, and then oversight and
reviews should be curtailed. Ann Rung, the new administrator for the
Office

of

Federal

Procurement

Policies,

recently

released

an

improvement plan identifying acquisition workforce talent development
as a key to innovation and performance (Miller, 2014). Some protest risk
must be accepted for the sake of efficiency and better decision making
(i.e., negotiations and award determination) leading to higher contractor
performance.
This research confirmed the presence of outside influence on
acquisition strategy decisions, and these influences carry associated
implications for contracting. During measurement scale development,
one interviewed expert commented, “I will tell you, legal pushes the
LPTA. They push it a lot.” One survey respondent offered, “At this
juncture, there are too many hands in the soup, and the procuring
contracting officer (PCO) authority has been diminished. Attorneys need
to resume the role of counselors again.” Since the source selection
method is not a matter of legal sufficiency, attorney influence is curious.
Selecting the source selection method is a contracting officer’s decision
based on experience, knowledge, and professional judgment. Otherwise,
Government agencies may employ a costly professional contracting
workforce with a high degree of accountability but diminished authority. If
not capable, trusted and empowered to make the necessary decisions,
procurement clerks (e.g., series 1105) would be much less costly than
contracting professionals (e.g., series 1102).
The fear of protest is positively related to an increase in
transaction costs. Costs were assessed in terms of the number of
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personnel involved in a sources selection and their allocated time. The
average cost per source selection was $235,236 (median = $165,832)
with a standard deviation of $291,620.

Notably, these costs are

understated by considering direct salaries only; they exclude the true
burdened cost of a government employee. An average of 9 different
people worked on a given source selection team in the various roles (an
average of 3.5 full-time equivalents).

As a percentage of the total

contract price, the transaction costs averaged 7.7% (median 1.2%).
Compared to common interagency surcharges for contracting services
(that cover post-award administration costs in addition to sourcing costs)
of one-to-eight percent, these pre-award sourcing-only costs seem
excessive. Thus, agencies may be operating at costs well above their
collected fees, and these costs can be traced to fear of protests.
Post hoc analysis showed that as the fear of protest increases,
the number of personnel and the actual procurement lead time increase.
From the data, the average planned PALT was 183 days. The average
actual PALT was 237 days. The difference, 54 days, constitutes added
transaction costs, indicating the degree to which efficiency is
compromised by fear of protest. While these salary costs may be
dismissed as sunk costs, certainly excess personnel could accomplish
other pertinent work if not serving on the source selection team for an
extended time. These opportunity costs should not be ignored,
particularly given the ubiquitous, persistent failures in other areas of
acquisition such as contract administration (DODIG, 2009). Measures
that reduce the fear of protest should decrease transaction costs.
Likewise, if evaluation, negotiation, internal reviews, and documentation
processes can be streamlined, and if agencies can accept more protest
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risk, perhaps lead time can be saved, resulting in reduced transaction
costs.
Given the government’s budget constraints and highly-leveraged
financing, the significant transaction costs associated with source
selections should not continue to be ignored. A first step would be to
capture the quantified resources required to execute a source selection
in a contract action reporting database (e.g., FPDS-NG). Agencies could
also follow the for-profit sector’s lead by assessing and publishing key
metrics such as total spend per sourcing full-time equivalent (CAPS
Research, 2011).
These results surrounding transaction costs raise questions
concerning the acquisition process in general. For instance, an important
criterion for new case law - and hence, new reactive policies and
regulations – is fairness, with little regard for efficiency. Is there a ceiling
cost on fairness?

Is there a point at which fairness is too costly?

Additionally, the high transaction costs suggest that the drivers of those
costs be considered. Can policies, procedures, laws, case law, and
regulations be reexamined and streamlined without compromising
fairness? Is government procurement at the point of a source selection
overhaul with a keen eye toward efficiency?
Study Limitations & Future Research Directions
Limitations of this study, and those common to survey
methodologies, should be considered. First, the response rate is
remarkably low. However, it is not unlike that of other published business
research. Melnyk et al., (2012) revealed a sharp decline in response
rates starting in 2002, with a steady decline of 1% annually. Five top
journals reported low-end survey response rates ranging from 3% to 8%.
Survey length is thought to be one of the key contributors to the decline.
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This survey was necessarily lengthy, and parts of it involved consulting
records rather than merely offering attitudes or opinions. Second,
because this sample came solely from one military service, the extent of
generalizability of the study findings to other government agencies is
unknown. Third, the research design relied upon self-reported data from
respondents introducing a threat of common method variance (CMV)
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Harman’s one-factor test revealed that when
all of the items were run in a single factor analysis, the unrotated solution
did not result in a single factor, nor did it result in a general factor that
accounted for most of the covariation (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Fourth,
the perceptual variable LPTA appropriateness was measured with a
single item; thus, its reliability could not be determined.
Due to the low amounts of variance in the dependent variables
explained by the predictors, other factors that affect the fear of protest,
compromised technical evaluations, added procurement lead time, and
contracting officer perceived authority should be explored. Future
research could also investigate why source selection methods that are
perceived to be inappropriate are sometimes used. Finally, future
research could replicate this study in civilian U.S. government agencies
and in those of other countries.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Questions for Measurement Scale Development And
Informant Demographics

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Interview question
How important to you is avoiding a bid protest?
Why is avoiding a bid protest important?
What are the negative consequences of a bid protest?
Are there any positive outcomes of receiving a bid protest?
Are some members of the source selection team more fixated
on avoiding a bid protest than others? Who? Why?
If there were no ability to protest, would you have done anything
differently in the past on a source selection (e.g., acquisition
strategy elements)?
Do you believe that source selection teams alter acquisition
strategies in order to avoid bid protests? What are the
outcomes of these alterations?
What extraordinary measures have you observed or heard of
that source selection teams have taken to avoid a bid protest?

Interviews
Contracting officers at two U.S. military organizations were
chosen for interviews due to: (a) the convenience of travel, (b) a
willingness to support the research, and (c) the availability of a wide
variety of contract types and contracted goods and services for wide
generalizability (e.g., external validity). A series of questions (see table
above) was asked to each participant.
Eighteen

individuals

were

interviewed

over

two

days.

Demographics of each respondent can be found in below. Each interview
was recorded and transcribed. The average interview lasted 26 minutes.
The interviews resulted transcribed into 229 pages. Informants were
given a copy of the conceptual model during the interview and asked
whether they agreed with the independent variables being used. They
were also asked if they would add any or take any away. One
respondent stated, “Okay. This is good. I don’t see anything that I need
to add.” Another contracting officer stated, “I think this is a great research
that you are doing because this is a bigger and bigger issue. I think you
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are right on.” Other statements that validated the model were, “I think I
like the model. For the most part it says everything.”

Rank/
Grade

Gender

GS-14

F

GS-13

M

GS-13

M

GS-14

M

GS-13

F

GS-14

F

GS-12

M

GS-13

M

GS-12

M

GS-13

M

GS-13

F

GS-13

M

GS-13

F

GS-13

M

Duty Title
Supv.
Contracting
Officer
Contracting
Officer
Contracting
Officer
Supv.
Contracting
Officer
Contracting
Officer
Supv.
Contracting
Officer
Contract
Specialist
Contracting
Officer
Contract
Specialist
Contracting
Officer
Contracting
Officer
Contracting
Officer
Contracting
Officer
Contracting
Officer
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Yrs.
Exp

# Source
Selections
(within 2
yrs)

# Bid
Protest
(within
2 yrs)

29

12

0

26

9

3

18

6

1

36

1

0

6

4

0

32

3

0

4

0

0

6

6

0

7

4

2

21

1

0

30

4

0

22

5

0

15

5

1

26

20

1

APPENDIX B
Latent Construct Measurement Scales
Label

Item

Std.
Loading

Fear of Protest
FEAR1*
At some point during the development
of the acquisition strategy or the source
selection process, I worried about
receiving a bid protest.
FEAR2*
I was concerned that the contract award
would be protested.
FEAR3*
I was anxious to get beyond the 10-day
point after contract award (or
debriefings) to determine whether or not
the contract would be protested.
FEAR5** During the development of the
acquisition strategy and throughout
proposal evaluation, to what extent
were you concerned that an offeror
might protest the contract award?
Perceived Contracting Officer Authority
AUTH1
I was empowered to make required
decisions
throughout the source
selection.
AUTH2
I was trusted that the decisions I made
throughout the source selection would
be appropriate.
AUTH3
My management supported me on the
decisions I made during the source
selection.

.82

.94
.83

.74

.83

.92

.82

Sufficiency of Planned PALT
PALTP1* The milestones for awarding this
contract were too aggressive.

.70

PALTP2

I was not rushed to award this contract.

.66

PALTP3

I had sufficient time to get this contract
awarded.

.93

Compromised Technical Evaluation
CTE2*
At least one technical evaluator
expressed concern about not being able
to say what needs to be said in the
technical evaluation.
CTE3*
At least one technical evaluator was
concerned that the constraints imposed
on his or her evaluations impeded the
evaluator’s ability to write a meaningful
evaluation.
CTE6*
Upon evaluation of proposals, at least
one technical evaluator expressed a
need to change at least one evaluation
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.84

.91

.45

criterion or its definition.
Requirement Criticality
RC2
This requirement supported a core
competency of our customer’s
organization.
RC3
Compared to other purchases for this
customer, this requirement was
important.
RC4*
An unsuccessful outcome of the RFP
would have had only minor
consequences to our customer
Contractor Performance
CP1
Product/service quality per
specifications
CP2
Delivery performance per specifications
CP3
Product/service consistently meets
customer expectations
CP5
Required service and/or technical
support
CP6
Non-conformance rate
CP7
Overall performance
Source Selection Method Appropriateness
SSMA1
Our acquisition strategy was the best
means to source our requirement.
SSMA2
Our acquisition strategy was the best
means to achieve our acquisition
objectives.
SSMA6
Our acquisition strategy provided the
best fit to the buying situation (e.g.,
complexity, dollar value, acquisition
objectives, contract length, performance
risk, criticality to the mission, availability
of supply, time available to award a
contract, etc.).
Protest Risk
PR1
Increased costs to settle a terminated
contract(s).
PR2
Time delay to the mission.

.84

.87

.73

.90
.92
.92
.89
.80
.94

.97
.94

.74

N/A
N/A

PR3

Embarrassment/shame.

N/A

PR4

Increase in workload to resolve the
protest.

N/A

PR5

Career repercussions for making a
mistake or omission that caused a bid
protest.

N/A

Notes: (1) All responses were obtained using 7-point Likert-type scales;
(2) * anchors of strongly agree and strongly disagree; (3)
** anchors of not at all concerned and extremely concerned
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